A recent ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California offers important guidance concerning the factual allegations required to pursue a website-tracking claim under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA).
In Firlej v. Petrosian Esthetic Enterprises, LLC, No. 2:26-cv-01030-MWC-AGR, 2026 WL 2575938 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2026), the court dismissed a CIPA claim arising from the alleged use of tracking pixels and third-party cookies on the SEV Laser Aesthetics website. The court determined that the amended complaint did not sufficiently establish that Google actually read or learned the contents of the plaintiff’s communications while those communications were still in transit. The plaintiff was nevertheless permitted another opportunity to amend the pleading.
The decision draws an important distinction between allegations that tracking technologies collect and transmit information and allegations showing that a third party actually read or learned the substance of a communication during its transmission.
Background of the Lawsuit
The plaintiff, Hania Rouhani, alleged that she visited the SEV Laser Aesthetics website for the purpose of scheduling a laser appointment. According to the allegations, tracking pixels and third-party cookies operating on the website collected information about her activity and transmitted that information to Google without her knowledge. The plaintiff characterized some of the information as sensitive health-related information.
Rouhani initially brought six causes of action, including a claim under Section 631(a) of CIPA. On June 18, 2026, the court dismissed the CIPA claim while giving the plaintiff permission to amend her complaint.
At that point in the litigation, the court concluded that Rouhani had plausibly alleged that the tracking technologies transmitted the “contents” of her communications. However, the court determined that the pleading did not adequately allege the separate requirement that Google actually read those communications while they were in transit.
Rouhani subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint. In the amended pleading, she added allegations asserting that Google had “read,” “used,” and “monetized” the information for advertising-related services and had learned the contents of the communications. The defendants again challenged the CIPA claim and moved for dismissal.
The Court’s Analysis of the “Reading” Requirement
Section 631(a) requires more than an allegation that information was collected or transmitted. The court explained that the concept of reading or learning the contents of a communication involves an effort to understand the substantive meaning of that communication.
The amended complaint alleged that Google read, analyzed, and learned the plaintiff’s information. The court, however, viewed those statements as largely conclusory because they repeated the legal requirement without providing sufficient factual allegations describing how Google actually read or understood the information.
The plaintiff also pointed to the targeted advertisements she allegedly received after interacting with the website. Rouhani argued that those advertisements could support an inference that Google had obtained information about her. The court acknowledged that targeted advertising could potentially support such an inference, but it found that the complaint primarily described the collection and transmission of data.
As a result, the court required more factual allegations connecting Google to the actual reading or learning of the substance of the plaintiff’s communications. The court did not conclude that the collection, transmission, or later use of information automatically satisfied the requirement that a third party read or learn the contents of a communication.
The Separate Requirement That Reading Occur “In Transit”
The court also considered the requirement that the alleged reading or interception take place while the communication was “in transit.”
A plaintiff does not necessarily have to provide every technical detail concerning an alleged interception at the pleading stage. However, the complaint must still provide enough factual information to give the defendant fair notice of how and when the plaintiff contends that the communication was intercepted.
Rouhani alleged that the tracking pixels collected and transmitted information concerning her online activity in real time as she navigated the website. The court found that simply describing the activity as occurring “in real time” was not enough to establish that Google actually read the communications during their transmission.
In the court’s assessment, the amended complaint adequately described real-time collection and transmission but did not sufficiently connect those events to simultaneous reading by Google. That distinction was significant because Section 631(a) addresses interception while a communication is in transit, rather than merely the collection of information or its subsequent use.
The Court Dismissed the Claim but Allowed Another Amendment
The court dismissed the CIPA claim because the First Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege that Google read or learned the contents of the plaintiff’s communications or that such reading occurred while the communications were in transit.
The dismissal did not permanently end the claim. The court granted Rouhani another opportunity to amend the complaint. That ruling indicates that additional factual allegations concerning the manner and timing of Google’s alleged reading of the information could potentially address the deficiencies identified by the court.
The decision should therefore be viewed as a ruling concerning the adequacy of the pleadings rather than a final determination regarding whether the alleged tracking actually occurred or whether the conduct ultimately violated CIPA.
What the Decision Means for Website Tracking Claims
The ruling highlights two separate questions that can become important in website-tracking claims under Section 631(a):
- Did the third party actually read or learn the substance of the communication? Alleging that tracking software collected or transmitted information may not, without additional facts, establish that the third party actually read or understood the communication.
- Did that reading occur while the communication was in transit? Characterizing data collection as occurring in “real time” may not be sufficient if the complaint does not plausibly explain how the alleged reading occurred during the transmission period.
For businesses, the ruling demonstrates why website-tracking disputes can depend heavily on the specific factual and technical allegations concerning the operation of the tracking technologies. The decision does not establish that tracking pixels, cookies, or similar technologies are categorically lawful. Nor does it resolve every potential CIPA theory that could arise from the use of website-tracking technology.
For plaintiffs, the decision emphasizes the importance of providing factual details supporting an alleged interception instead of relying primarily on legal labels such as “read,” “analyzed,” or “monetized.”
A complaint alleging that a third-party tracking provider intercepted communications may therefore need to explain more than the existence of tracking technology. The pleading must connect the technology and the alleged recipient to the specific statutory requirements at issue, including the alleged reading or learning of communication contents and the timing of that activity.
Frequently Asked Questions
What case did the court decide?
The case was Firlej v. Petrosian Esthetic Enterprises, LLC, No. 2:26-cv-01030-MWC-AGR, 2026 WL 2575938 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2026).
What website technology was involved?
The plaintiff alleged that tracking pixels and third-party cookies operating on the SEV Laser Aesthetics website collected and transmitted information to Google.
Why did the court dismiss the CIPA claim?
The court determined that the amended complaint did not adequately allege that Google actually read or learned the contents of the plaintiff’s communications. The court also found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that any such reading occurred while the communications were in transit.
Did the court decide that the alleged tracking was lawful?
No. The court’s ruling was based on the sufficiency of the allegations presented in the amended complaint. The plaintiff was allowed another opportunity to amend. The decision therefore should not be characterized as a final ruling that the alleged tracking was lawful.
What should plaintiffs explain when bringing a Section 631(a) claim?
The decision indicates that plaintiffs should include factual allegations explaining how a third party allegedly read or learned the substance of a communication and when that alleged reading took place in relation to the communication’s transmission.
Sources and References
- CIPAWorld: “Reading Between the Pixels: Court Dismisses CIPA Claim Over Tracking Tools”
- Firlej v. Petrosian Esthetic Enterprises, LLC, No. 2:26-cv-01030-MWC-AGR, 2026 WL 2575938 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2026), as cited in the CIPAWorld article.
Disclaimer
This article is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It summarizes the court ruling as reported by CIPAWorld. Allegations contained in the complaint should not be treated as established facts, and the outcome of any other lawsuit will depend on its particular facts, claims, evidence, and procedural posture. Readers with questions about a specific legal matter should consult qualified legal counsel.